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Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal Policy
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a framework for analyzing the effects of fiscal policy
on the real exchange rate. The short—run impact of various types of fiscal
measures are considered as well as the dynamics of adjustment to long—run steady
states. The analysis and related simulations suggest that the effect of fiscal
policy changes on the real exchange rate can vary widely and will depend closely
on a number of structural features, including the degree of asset substitutability,
the composition of government spending, and the initial size of the public debt














The faus and simple dictum of the static Mundell—Fleming nxdel that a
fiscal expansion induces a real exchange rate appreciation is found by ignoring
several of the key channels linking exchange rates and fiscal policy. The
Mundell—Fleming nDdel ignores: (1) the growth of public debt that my follow a
fiscal expansion; (2) the fiscal measures that mist ultimately be taken to
service the growing debt; (3) the wealth and portfolio implications of current
account deficits induced by the fiscal expansion; and () forward—looking
expectations in the asset narket. Once these factors are brought to bear, the
conclusions regarding both short— and long—term exchange rate uovements my
easily be reversed.
A fiscal policy change has direct effects pn the level and composition of
national spending, as well as on the level and composition of national wealth.
Spending effects my pull the exchange rate in one direction, while portfolio
effects pull in the other. A thorough analysis of these effects is made
difficult by the fact that a "single" fiscal policy change is itself, in
general, a seauerjce of actions, in which different stages of the fiscal action
have differing implications for the exchange rate. A debt—financed +ax cut, for
example, involves a sequence of growing public debt and rising debt—service
obligations. Over time, taxes must increase, or expenditures must fall, in
order to service the debt. In forward—looking asset markets, the current
exchange rate will react to the current tax change, as well as to the
anticipated growth in debt and the future changes in taxes and expenditures.
There is not, to date, a simple framework for sorting out the short—run and
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long—run effects of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate. It is the purpose
of this paper to offer such a framework, by recasting the standard
Mundell—Flerning framework in a dynamic setting. Surprisingly few studies have
focused on fiscal policy in a dynamic setting. Some results can be found in
Kouri (1976) for the case of perfect substitutability of domestic and foreign
assets and perfect foresight. The assumption of perfect capital
substitutability is dropped in Thrnovsky (1976), but his nrdel, as those of
Branson (1976) and Hodrick (1980), abandon the assumption of forward looking
expectations. On the other side, the nodels of Branson and Buiter (1962) and
Kouri are in many respects close to ours, except that these authors choose not
to take into account the important role of a growing public debt. For a recent
survey and extensive bibliography on exchange rates and fiscal policy, see
Penati (1983).
The nndel analyzed in this paper, and presented in the following section,
focuses on the real side of the econonw. It specifies a goods narket. with
standard spending and trade balance equations, and a portfolio balance ndel
which takes perfect asset substitutability as a special case. To this basic
static structure are added three dynamic considerations: the effect of budget
deficits on the stock of public debt, the effect of current account imbalances
on the stock of foreign asset holdings, and the assumption of perfect foresight
governing the exchange rate. The steady state effects of fiscal policy are.
taken up in Section 3, where we consider the case of a balanced budget expansion
and of a tax cut. The case of an increase in public spending is not included as
it can be thought of as the combination of a balanced budget expansion together
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with a tax cut. We then deal with the dynamics. In the balanced budget case,
we offer a graphical solution, in Section 4. In the case of a tax cut, we study
analytically the impact effect and resort to simulations in order to examine the
entire transition path. This is done in Section 5.
In order to keep the nodel analytically tractable, we have had to resort to
some simplifying assumptions, which are spelled out in detail in the next
section. Most of them are of pure convenience and relaxing them does not
modify the results in any essential way, as we show through simulation
experiments, presented in Section 6. One of them should be pointed out at the
outset: we assume here that prices are perfectly flexible so that output never
departs from the full employment level. Although we believe that 'we still
capture the nm forces relating the real exchange rate to a fiscal expansion,
we are clearly unable to cover the stabilization aspects of fiscal policy in an
open econony.
The rain results of the paper can be broadly stated as follo's. When
domestic and foreign assets are close substitutes, a fiscal expansion leads to a
short—run appreciation and a long—run depreciation. Exactly the opposite occurs
with low asset substitutability, namely the real exchange rate depreciates in
the short run and appreciates in the long run. Intuitively, the fiscal
expansion creates an excess demand for domestic goods. Unless output is fully
responsive, and in most of the paper we actually assume fixed output, goods
market equilibrium is restored by crowding out private demand, through a
reduction of wealth or a rise in the real interest rate, or by crowding out
foreign demand through a real exchange rate appreciation. High asset
substitutability means that the domestic interest rate is closely tied to the•
world rate of interest (taking into account, of course, the expected rate of
depreciation), and cannot adjust to the goods market disequilibrium.
Furthermore, in the short run, wealth is fixed, except possibly for valuation
A
effects. Hence we need an immediate appreciation to eliminate excess demand.
In the long run, the current account nust be brought back to equilibrium, which
calls for a depreciation, while wealth is reduced to crowd out private demand
and maintain goods nnrket equilibrium. When asset substitutability, is low, the
domestic interest rate is free to increase in response to goods market pressure
and to allow for the anticipated portfolio reshuffling. If this effect is
strong enough that the crowding out of private spending outweighs the direct
fiscal expansion, it is easy to. see how the results obtained under close
substitutability get reversed.
2. The Model
The static part of the model describes the goods market equilibrium
condition. We consider an econonv specialized in the production of a good which
is an imperfect consumption substitute for a single foreign good. The relative
price of the foreign 'good is denoted A, which we will also term "the real
exchange rate." The econon is small. in the narket for foreign capital and
output, so that world interest rates and prices of the foreign good are
exogenous. This is the traditional set up as found in Mundell (1963) and Kouri
(1916). The goods market clearing condition is:
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(i) =c+g+T
where is the domestic output, assumed to be constant, c is total private
spending, g is public spending and T represents the trade balance. All
variables are real and defined in terms of the domestic good.
Private spending is an increasing function of disposable income (y—r) and
financial wealth, w, and a decreasing function of the interest rate, r. This is
described by the following linear equation;
(2) c = (l—s)(y—r) + 6w .
As suggested by finite—horizon optimizing behavior of households (see, e.g.,
Blanchard (1983)), the coefficient 6 in (2) will generally exceed the interest
rate, i.e., 6 > r. We will naintain this assumption throughout.
Domestic residents hold two categories of interest bearing assets:
domestic public debt B and foreign bonds B*. We denote the real value of the
public debt as b = B/P (and s.milarly b* = B*/P*). With the real exchange rate
equal to A, private real financial wealth is:
(3) wb+Ab'
Foreign residents do not hQld domestic assets. The trade balance, expressed in
units of domestic goods, is a decreasing function of domestic spending, and an
increasing function of foreign spending c and of the real exchange rate:
(h) T_mc_mGg+fl*c*+UA
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In (14), we allow for the public marginal prospensity to import
to differ from
the private sector's marginal propensity m. Throughout the paper c is assumed
to remain constant and will be dropped.
We now introduce the three dynamic equations of the xdel. First is the
governnent budget constraint, which describes the path of the real value of
public debt:
() =r+g—t
where a dot represents a tine derivative ( db/dt). This equation is
linearized around the initial steady state (an initial steady value is
characterized by the 0 subscript as in b0) and, for simplicity of notation, we
express all variables as deviations from their initial steady state values (so
that 3?=o).
(5') = rb + b0r + g— r
The initial value of r is set equal to the world rate of interest r*. As will
be seen shortly, this assumption implies a zero risk premium in the initial
steady state1
Foreign assets are acquired through current account surpluses, which equal
the sum of trade surpluses and net service account receipts:
(6) t" T + r*Xb*
This equation can be linearized around the initial steady state, where A0 = 1:
(6') = r*b* + r*bX + T
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The evolution of X is tied to the interest rate differential r_r* so as to
maintain portfolio balance. A simple linear portfolio balance condition can be
cast as)
OXb* — (l—9)b = a(r*_r+X/X)
It expresses the relative dennnd for foreign end domestic assets as a function
of the expected yield differential. As we assume perfect foresight, the yield
differential is given by the real interest differential plus the rate of
depreciation. The parameter 6 is interpreted as the narginal propensity to hold
foreign assets out of wealth, while a is a measure of the degree of asset
substitutability. This formulation allows two channels for deviations from the
interest parity condition: less than perfect substitutability (a finite), or no
capital bility (@ = o). It can be inverted and re—arranged to give:
(y) = r — r* + $[exb* — (l—O)b], with 4' = 1/a
Linearizing (7) and assuming no risk premium in the initial steady state yields
the following condition:
(7') = r — r* + ip[eb* + 8bX — (i—oThJ
Pending the description of the fiscal policy experiments to be conducted,
the nodel is now complete. It focuses solely on the real side of the economy,
as no equations have been given for the nominal variables such as the price
level or nominal exchange rate. A more complete nodel, with these equations,
shows that our set—up is restrictive in one key way. As prices are implicitly
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and in particular the stock of outstanding public debt, so that b(O) c bc. We
overlook this effect by taking b(O) = b0 assumption. This simplification is
exactly correct under any of the following three circumstances: i) there is no
initial outstanding public debt (b0 = 0); 2) government bonds are indexed; or
3) the denand for money is interest inelastic and independent of wealth, so that
a constant money supply implies a constant price level. Our treatment is
approxinately correct if the interest elasticity of money is small. The
simplification is crucial to keeping down the dirnmensionality of the model, and
thereby to deriving analytical results. In section 6.1 we explain how the model
is changed if we eliminate the simplification and show, through simulations,
that the assumption seems to be of minor consequence.
We now turn to the specification of the fiscal policy rules. They have to
satisfy (5). As is well known (see, e.g., Christ (1979)), (5) is a source of
potential instability. This instability is removed if the policy rule implies
that any budget deficit is corrected over time quickly enough to overcome the
ever—increasing debt service component rb. A convenient (though by no means
necessary!) way of guaranteeing stability is to assume that the government
closes the deficit at a rate is, bringing its debt to a long run target level :
(8) =
With (5) and (8), it is easy to specify the three following types of fiscal
expansion where, again, all variables are defined as deviations from their
initial steady state values:
(9) Balance Budget Expansion g = A
= A+b0r
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(10) Tax Cut g = 0 —ut + b0r ÷
(ii) Government Spending Increase r = 0 g = pS — b0r — (I1+r*)b
The balanced budget expansion implies an immediate and equal increase in g and
r. Subsequently, as the interest rate changes, so do the interest payments on
the existing debt. In order to mintain a balanced budget, the government must
either raise taxes, as in (9), or reduce spending (not shown).
In the tax cut case, government spending is kept constant throughout.
Taxes are initially cut by the aiunt Ar =
—pB. Thereafter, in order to satisfy
(5) and (8), they must be raised so as to close gradually the budget deficit in
the face of a rising debt, and to service the interest on existing debt.
The last case, the spending expansion, is analogous: g is initially increased
by u, and then is gradually reduced.
It is important to realize two implications of (io) or (11). Consider the
tax cut case: the government can only set two out of the three policy variables
Ar, p and 6. If, for exanple, it decides on the magnitude of the tax cut, the
faster it decides to close the ensuing deficit (the larger ji), the lover will
be the final level of the debt =
—At/u. Conversely, if it accepts a high
value for E, it will imply a slow adjustment parameter P.2 The second
implication of (10) and (11) is that the fiscal stance in the steady state is
the opposite of the initial nove: an initial expansion will lead to a long run
contraction as is shown by the following steady state levels:




From (io') we see that a tax cut that raises ultinately raises r. These
results are the simple consequence of the long—run requirement that the budget
be in equilibrium:
The full m3del consists of equations Ci) to (8) together with any of the
three policy regime equations (s), (io) or (11). It can be reduced to a system
of two differential equations in A and b* as shown below for the balanced
budget case (i.e., using (9)) and for the tax cut case (i.e., using (io)).
Balance Budget Expansion
(12) [11 = [a/(l_m)
+ b(5/ + t°) + so)] [x









a/(l-m) +b(o/ + o) (s +
se)] [Al
a/(l—m) +r*b r* ] L*i




with = + + (l—s)b0. Note that in (13) Ar = —pt, and b(t) = _(At/p)(l_e_hit).
Because of our specification (B), the public debt b follows a path
independent of A and b*. As it turns out, the transition matrix governing the
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law of ixtion of A and b* is the saUte under both policy regimes. It differs in
the case of a public spending expansion as described by (ii).
Because b* is predetermined and A is non—predetermined, stability requires
that the determinant be negative. This is the case when:
(lb)
As can be seen from (2), (3) and (6), this condition implies that an increase
in foreix asset holdings will have a negative effect on the current account
(a*/ab* < 0). Since we assume that 6 > r*, (i1) will always be satisfied.
3. Steady State Effects
The steady state is attained when both goods and assets markets are in
equilibrium with 5. = C, while the current account is in balance. We show below
that, in general, a fiscal expansion leads to a long—run depreciation when
domestic and.foreign assets are close substitutes, and to a long—run
appreciation in the case of a low degree of substitutability. Heuristically,
the fiscal expansion creates an excess demand for domestic goods and a' trade
deficit. Given the spending and trade balance functions (2) and (14), a return
to equilibrium requires adjustments in w, r and A. Consider first the case of
perfect asset substitutability. In the steady state, portfolio balance requires
r = r*, so that the adjustment will be achieved through changes in w, i.e., in
Ab*, and in A. In order to eliminate the excess demand for goods, we need
either an appreciation or a reduction in wealth. But an appreciation would
worsen the current account so that what actually happens is a drop in wealth
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(brought about by current account deficits along the adjustment path). The
stability condition (114) implies that the drop in wealth has a stronger effect
on spending than on the current account, because a reduction in Ab*, which
decreases spending and improves the trade balance, also implies a worsening in
the interest service account. So, while a reduction in wealth alone would
restore goods nurket equilibrium, it has to be supplemented by a depreciation to
bring the current account back into balance. Now, if domestic and foreign
assets are imperfect substitutes, the reduction in Xb* must be accompanied by a
higher interest rate in order to naintain portfolio balance. This, in turn,
depresses private spending. If this effect is strong enough to ire than offset
the expansionary effect of the fiscal stimulus, the preceding results are
inverted and the long—run adjustment is characterized by a high interest rate,
an increase in wealth and an exchange rate appreciation (the country will then
run current account surpluses on the adjustment to steady state).
We now formally establish and qualify these results, using Figure 1 for
the case of a balanced budget expansion and Figure It for the case of a tax cut.
The CA schedule depicts the balanced current account condition together with
goods market equilibrium. Substituting (2) and (It) in the goods market
equilibrium condition (1), we obtain the following expression for the trade
balance:
(15) T = [aX + (m_m0)gl/(l—m)
From (15), we see that the trade balance is only a function of A and g. This is
so because goods market equilibrium forces the other determinants of T, r and w
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to adjust so that private spending always exactly fills the gap left by public
and foreign demand for domestic goods. What (15) implies is that net foreign
asset holdings Ab* affect the current accountonly through the interest service
account, r*Ab*. Starting then from current account balance, an increase in Xb*
creates a surplus and requires an appreciation to restore equilibrium, thus the
downward sloping CA schedule. The GG schedule describes goods market equilibrium
together with portfolio balance when = 0: the interest rate is solved out.
It is downward sloping because an increase in Xb* raises wealth and therefore
private spending. The resulting excess demand for domestic goods must be
eliminated through an exchange rate appreciation. Note that, in addition to a
direct wealth effect, under imperfect substitutability an increase in Ab* also
raises spending by pushing down the interest rate, requiring a larger
appreciation and leading to a steeper GG schedule. The GG schedule is steeper
than the CA schedule because, holding Xb* constant, an appreciation reduces
demand and worsens the current account by exactly the same amount (the reduction
in net foreign demand), while the stability condition (in) is that the wealth
effect on spending of an increase in Ab* is larger than the interest paynent
effect on the current account.
3.1 Balanced Budget Expansion
Figure 1 shows the case of a balanced budget expansion, where public debt
remains unchanged.4 We consider first the case where the private and public
marginal propensity to import are equal: m In this case, the fiscal











that it does not directly affect the current account, so that the CA schedule
remains unchanged. Yet, a balanced budget expansion, as described by (9),
raises demand for domestic goods by s(1—m)à. Equilibrium in the goods market
can be restored either by an appreciation or by a drop in wealth: the GG curve
shifts down and to the left, from G0G0 to G1G1 in Figure 1. Consequently, if
= m, the exchange rate unambiguously depreciates in the long run, with
foreign wealth, and therefore net foreign asset holdings, falling.5
It is easy now to consider the case when * m, so that fiscal policy
alters the composition of demand. We only need to add this new effect to the
previous case. Starting then from point B, if m° < in, the fiscal expansion
displaces demand away from foreign goods toward domestic goods. This shift
affects the goods market and the current account by the same amount, moving both
schedules downwards as the same appreciation is required to crowd out foreign
demand and restore both equilibria. Consequently, the change in A is reduced
when < in. For uP much less than in, A nay actually appreciate in the long
run. On the càntrary, with riP > in, both curves shift upward, increasing the
size of the depreciation. Thus, only a strong change of the composition of
demand towards domestic goods is capable of producing a long run appreciation.
The portfolio balance effect (when assets are imperfect substitutes) does
not alter this result. As b* is reduced, with a constant stock of public debt
b, the domestic interest rate must rise to convince domestic residents to hold a
larger share of their wealth in the form of domestic assets. Higher interest
rates, in turn, crowd out private spending, jartially undoing the expansionary
effect of fiscal policy. As a consequence, we obtain less of a depreciation and
—16—
a smaller drop in wealth. Graphically, the GO curve becomes steeper because the
wealth effect on spending is strengthened through the interest rate channel, but
the downward shift is the same. What this implies, then, is that we now need a
relatively smaller shift of the composition of demand c m) to obtain a long
run appreciation.
This is summarized in Figure 2, where the long run change in the real
exchange rate is described as a function of ?6'. The parameters Oip capture the
portfolio balance effect on the interest rate, while is the total interest
elasticity of spending. With t = 0, the domestic interest rate cannot depart, in
the steady state, from the world level r*. As $ increases, the interest rate
bears a larger share of the adjustment to the excess demand of goods, leaving to
A the task of adjusting, when riP * in, to the change in the composition of
demand.
The role of the size of the initial outstanding public debt b0 is entirely
captured by = + (l—s)b0. The larger the initial debt, the nxre interest elastic
is private spending because a rise in the interest rate raises the burden of the
debt, forcing the government to raise taxes.
Finally, we consider the role of the initial debt position of the country
vis—a—vis the rest of the world b8. It does not affect either the change in A
or the change in wealth, i.e. in Ab*. Hence, the change in b*, after
linearization, is:
(i6) = —
This is shown as Figure 3. When b = 0, b and wealth change by the same
amount. If b > 0, a long run depreciation increases the domestic value of

















increase in wealth, while with b < 0, the depreciation amounts to a higher
debt and calls for b* > Ab*. (The results are reversed when the exchange
rate appreciates in the long run.) The only important point here is that
for b sufficiently large in absolute value, b* and wealth nay actually move
in opposite directions.
3.2 Tax Cut
As government spending is kept unchanged (see (10), we know from (15) that
there is no direct effect of a tax cut on the trade balance so that the CA
schedule never shifts, allowing us to focus exclusively on the goods r.rket
schedule GG.6 The GG schedule nay shift up or down, depending on the relative
magnitudes of three effects. First is the long—run increase in taxes necessary
to generate the revenues of a higher debt service (see (10')): this depresses
spending. Second is the direct wealth effect of the public debt increase, which
raises spending. The stability condition (ib) guarantees that the first effect
always dominates, so that the overall steady state direct effect of the tax cut
is indeed expansionary. In Figure 14, this is shown as the shift from G0G0 to
01G1. The third effect is the portfolio balance effect. As b rises,'vith
domestic and foreign assets imperfect substitutes, the hone interest rate rises,
reducing domestic spending. This tends to push the GG schedule back to the
right in Figure lj• The conclusion is that if assets are close substitutes, the
economy moves to a point like A1. On the contrary, with low substitutability,
the interest rate may increase by enough to depress demand, outweighing the














The conclusion, then, is that there exists a critical value of j, say
such that i C leads to long—run depreciation, and ij > *0 leads to long—run
appreciation. The critical value is given by = La —
b. The Dynamics of a Balanced Budget Expansion
In this section, we describe graphically the behavior of the system defined
by (12). From Section 3, we know that several combination of outcomes are
possible for A arid b' in the steady state. We only discuss here a subset of the
possible cases. The laws of nDtion are described in Figure 6 with the schedules
= 0 and = 0. The interpretation of these schedules is similar to,
respectively, those given for the GO and CA schedules of Section 3. The system
is saddle—path stable when (il4) is satisfied, convergence occutring along SS.
We first take up the case where in0 = m so that the = 0 schedule remains
unchanged after a balanced—budget expansion. In Figure 7.1, we show that, on
impact, there is a jump appreciation as the econolv moves from point A to
point B. This corresponds to the excess demand for domestic goods created by
the fiscal expansion. Equilibrium is restored through a crowding out' of foreign
demand as a result of the appreciation. There is also a crowding out of private
spending as the hone interest rate rises for two reasons: the expected
depreciation and, with imperfect substitutability, a lower value of Xb due to
the appreciation.9 The convergence process that follows, from point B to
point C is one of a continuous depreciation and current account deficits.
When in0 > in, in addition to the previous effects, we now have a shift










the excess demand for domestic goods and worsens the curent account surplus. When
= m + s(1—m), for example, the 5.0 schedule actually stays in its initial
position as shown in Figure T.2. In this case, the shift of spending away from
domestic goods exactly offsets the expansion created by the fiscal policy
change. Yet domestic demand weakens since asset market equilibrium requires an
increase in the domestic interest rate to rake up for the expected depreciation.
Consequently, we need a crowding in of foreign demand, and this is achieved
through a jump depreciationJ° The convergence path is as in the previous case.
When, on the contrary, m0 < m, we have seen the possibility of a long run
appreciation, together with an increase in b*, provided assets are sufficiently
imperfect substitutes. This is shown in Figure T.3. There is a jump
appreciation for two reasons. First, there is a strong excess demand for
domestic goods as the change in the composition of spending reinforces the
effect of the balanced budget expansion. Second, with the expectation of an
appreciation, portfolio balance requires a drop in the interest rate. The
ensuing convergence path includes a continuous appreciation and current account
surpluses.
We conclude this section with a summary of the initial impact of the fiscal
expansion on the real exchange rate.11 The results are described in Figure 8.
One channel is the change of composition of demand which occurs when the
government's marginal propensity to import differs from the private sector's
marginal propensity: this is crucial in determining the sign of the initial
change. The size of the change is shown to be related to the portfolio balance






























of adjustrnt can be absorbed by a change in the interest rate, and the smaller
the exchange rate jump.
5. The Dynamics of a Tax Cut
5.1 The Solution
The system (13) is not amenable to a simple diagrammatic solution as in
the balanced budget case. Our strate' in this section, therefore, is to
characterize the general structure of the convergence path, to show analytically
the impact effect, and describe the convergence path through simulations.
The general solution to (13) is:
(ii) b* = S*(1...e2t) + (s1+u)(s2+p) (j + bgr*) (eS2t_e_L1t)
(18) x = X —
-:m br* (b*_S*) + ___ e'
where A = — (a—o) (l_s)(ii+r*) and s, 2 are the eigen values of the
transition matrix, i > O,s< o.'2 As usual, all variables are expressed as
deviations from the steady state.
Although the above laws of motion are hard to "see through," they yield a
certain number of insights into the characteristics of the convergence path.
From (18), we see that when the last term is small, there is a tendency for A
and b* to nove in opposite directions, i.e. to observe an appreciation
(reap. a depreciation) together with a current account surplus (resp. a deficit).
—26—
Yet this will not always be the case, especially in the early part of the
adjustment process. From (iT) we see that the convergence path of b*, and
therefore A, will not necessarily be nonotonic as in the balanced budget case.
This will be important in interpreting X as the expected change of the exchange
rate since it now may include a perfectly foreseen non—monotonic path. If in
the long run net forei asset holdings are to decrease (resp. increase), so
that Th c 0 (resp. * > o), the first term in (17) shows that the current
account will tend to be in deficit (resp. surplus). Yet, the second term alerts
us to the possibility that this xiny.not be true early in the adjustment process,
if < i.e. if the government is slow in curbing its budget deficit.
5.2 The Impact Effect
Solving (18) at time zero when the tax cut is put in place and using the
steady state solutions of footnote 7 we obtain the jump of A at time t 0:
6 + (l_s)(s1_r*) — (i—o)
(19) x(o) — A = Ar —0 s1¼S7P
We observe the effects of the now familiar
three channels: a wealth effect on
spending (6); a tax reduction effect (1—s); and a portfolio balance effect
(1p(l—e)). The two first terms correspond to an increased demand for domestic
goods and act toward an appreciation. The third term reflects the increase in
the interest rate due to an increase in b, and the corresponding lessening
of
domestic spending. With perfect or high substitutability, the two first effects
dominate and the exchange rate appreciates on
impact. (Note that this is the
case where the exchange rate depreciates in the long runt) On the contrary,
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when asset substitutability is low, the exchange rate depreciates on impact and
appreciates in the long run 113 There is, finally, an intermediate situation
where the exchange rate appreciates both on impact and in the long run. Note
that the degree of substitutability enters as t't(i—e), where $(l—e) is the
effect of the increase in b on the interest rate, and • is the interest
elasticity of private spending. If, at the margin, domestic residents want to
hold iinstly foreign assets, i.e. 6 is close to 1, then the increase in b does
not affect the exchange rate. Figure 9 summarizes the foregoing dicussion,
describing the impact effect x(o) — A0 for a given tax cut. It is based on
simulations described in the next section.
5.3 Simulations
In order to examine the complete path of adjustment, we now turn to some
simulation exercises. The simulations are based on the following parameter
values:
r*.05 p .l
s =.2 ó =.1 • =.8
m =in*=.3 mGo a =.12 e =.
and the initial steady state values chosen are:
= 1.0 c0 = 0.663 g0 = 0.337 T0 = 0
b00 b0 ToO.337 A0=1
The experiments reported concern a tax cut enacted at time t = 0. The
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this implies that domestic debt increases in the long—run by .5, i.e. 50 percent
of output.
A. Perfect Asset Substitutability
Figure 10 presents the results obtained when domestic and foreign assets
are perfect substitutes. Following the initial jump appreciation, the exchange
rate continuously depreciates towards its steady state value, which represents a
long run depreciation relative to the initial value (the exact values obtained
are shown in Table 1 at the end of the section). Public debt is accumulated by
domestic residents, replacing net foreign asset holdings. This entails a path
of continuous current account deficits. Notice that wealth must fall in the
steady state so that the cumulative current account deficits exceed the
accumulated budget deficits. The reason can be seen with the goods market
equilibrium condition (is). As A depreciates in the long run, it creates an
excess demand for domestic good. With g unchanged, private spending must be
reduced and this is brought about by
the wealth reduction, since r returns to the world level r*. The path of r is
shown in the last panel of Figure 9. On impact it rises above r* and then
approaches monotonically its steady state value.
B. Moderate Imperfect Substitutability
As noted earlier, there is a range for t. the degree of imperfect asset
substitutability, such that the exchange rate appreciates both in the immediate
short run and in the long run. This case of "moderate" imperfect
substitutability is shown in Figure 11, for $ = .2, and exhibits a number of
interesting particularities. First, as the possibility was noted in our earlier
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discussion of the laws of notion (17) and (18), the convergence paths of A and
b* are not monotonic. Second, there is a period where A and b* move in the sane
direction, so that we obtain a depreciating exchange rate while the current
account is in surplus. Third, the exchange rate jump appreciates on impact, and
then immediately starts depreciating.
What happens can be explained as follows. On impact, the tax cut creates
an excess demand for goods (smaller than when i = 0 because of the larger
increase in the interest rate), hence the jump in appreciation. As asset
stocks can only change gradually, at t = 0, we still have b = b0 and b* =
so that with r(O) > r, portfolio balance requires that the exchange rate be
(correctly) expected to depreciate. The surge in spending creates a trade
deficit, rapidly reversed as the exchange rate depreciates. Over time b grows,
so portfolio balance becomes compatible, with r > r* and C 0.
C. Strong Imperfect Substitutability
Finally, in Figure 12, we show the simulation obtained for J = 2. Here we
find an impact depreciation and a long run appreciation. After the fiscal
expansion, the current account actually moves into surplus, as the sharp rise in
home interest rates reduces domestic absorption. While the current account is
always in surplus, the exchange rate, again, exhibits a non—monotorlic path. For
the same reason as in the previous case, the exchange rate must be expected to
depreciate at t = 0, so that the initial upward jump of A is followed by further
depreciations.
In the last two cases, the long run interest rate lies above the world
























private portfolios. The relatively high interest rates
crowd out private
demand, leading to current account surpluses, the accumulation
of foreign assets
and the rise in private wealth.




















It ray be worth recalling here that what matters for x(o) is not 4' alone
but 4, where = + (1—s)b0. Here we have taken b0 =
0. For a positive
initial debt, the degree of imperfect substitutability $
becomes much more
powerful in reversing the perfect substitutability
result. We will have
examples of that in the next section.
6. nsions
In this section, we propose to explore, through
simulations of the tax cut
case, the practical
importance of some of the restrictive assumptions
imposed on
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our earlier ncidel. We consider, successively, the effect of price changes on
the real value of nominal domestic bonds, the case of variable output, and the
distinction between short and long term interest rates.
6.i. Real and Nominal Debt
As the fiscal expansion is bound to bring about changes in the price level,
the real value of the domestic public debt is going to be affected) We have
assumed away this complication so far, by assuming a zero interest elasticity in
the demand for noney as a way of making the price level constant. In this
section we reconsider the question by adding to the itdel (equations (1) to (7),
(10)) the following equations:
(20) b=B/P





These equations need little explanation. We simply introduce the
distinction between the nominal (B) and real (b) value of public debt, and
write in (21) the government budget constraint in nominal terms. We also define
in (22) the nominal interest rate through the Fisher relation. We introduce
the interest rate in the demnd for noney equation (23), where R is the
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(25) eX+p
These equations need little explanation. We simply introduce the
distinction between the nominal (B) and real (b) value of public debt, and
write in (21) the government budget constraint in nominal terms. We also define
in (22) the nominal interest rate through the Fisher relation. We introduce
the interest rate in the demand for xney equation (23), where R is the
log of the nominal nxney stock, which remains constant. p = log P is
linearized in (2b). Finally, we define the nominal exchange rate e = Ap in the
linearized form (25). This assumes constant prices abroad, normalized at 1, and
in the initial steady state e0 = 1. Prices are still assumed to be fully
flexible, so that output stays at its full employment level. When y = 0, this
model is identical to the ntdel of the previous sections. In Table 2, we report
the results of simulations performed for selected values of -y, after
linearization of (2) and (21). We have taken = 1 and i0 = r0 = r*, with the
value of R adjusted so that in the initial steady state, p0 = 0. Of course, we
need to assume b0 * 0, so that we put b0 at 50 percent of GDP. Thus the
simulations were run with:
= 0.5, = 1 (so that Ar = —0.05 as in Section 6)
= 0.1875 t0 = 0.213.




4' = ___ ___
y=0 yO.5 y2 y=O y0.5 y0 i0.5
x(o) o.8614 0.863 0.862 0.974 0.973
1.117 1.1114
3: 1.175 1.175 1.175 0.953 0.953 0.8145
0.8145
r(0) 0.0614 0.064 0.064 0.079 0.079 0.099
0.099
P 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.080 0.080 0.097
0.097
p(o) 1.0 1.007 1.10 1.0 1.015
1.0 1.025
b(0) 0.5 0.1497 0.45 b.s 0.1493 0.5
o.1468
e(0) o.864 0.670 0.962 0.9714 0.988 1.117 1.139
The three different values of $ correspond to the three cases discussed in
Section 5. It is interesting to note, first, that with b0 > 0, considerably
smaller values of 4, ritdify the qualitative results obtained under perfect
substitutability (when p = o). Actually, with an initial debt equal to 50
percent of Gil?, small departures of the perfect substitutability case produce
quite strong effects.
The other striking result is that with our parameter values, the effect
of price increases on the real value of nominal assets produce effects of
minimal importance on the real exchange rate (less than one percent). Even for
an interest semi—elasticity as high as y = 2, with the price level jumping on
impact by 10 percent, the effect on X remains trivial. At this stage, we
conclude therefore that our earlier assumption = 0 is tenable.
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6.2 Variable Output
In this section, we drop the assumption of perfectly flexible prices, by
postulating a Phillips curve relationship:
(26) . w(y —
The utidel consists of equations (1) to (8), (10), and (22) to (26). Thus
we revert to the zero interest elasticity assumption in the demand for ney.
Two broad results stand out. First, the exchange rate is higher on
impact the lower w is. When output supply is allowed to respond to the
expansionary pressure of the tax cut, the exchange rate appreciates by less, or
Table 3
ip=0 . =.2 __________
w=.5 w=.25 =.Ol w=.25 w=.25
A(0) o.8b14 0.853 0.856 o.8614 0.897 0.927 i.o46 1.118
r(0) 0.066 0.062 0.063 0.065 0.078 0.078 0.109 0.101
y(0) 1.0 1.008. 1.007 1.007 1.0 1.013 1.0 1.029
depreciates nrre, than in the fixed output case. Although this effect is by no
means trivial, the qualitative features of our earlier results reiin unchanged.
The second result is the well known one that the output response to fiscal
policy in an open econonv is inversely related to the degree of asset
substitutability. This is shown itst clearly in Figure 13, where the output































































6.3 Short—Term and Long—Term Interest Rates
So far we have assumed that private spending is responsive to the short
term interest rate r. The short term rate is the relevant one in the portfolio
balance condition (assuming that portfolios can be costless],y re—arranged each
period). But it would clearly be preferable to have private spending depend
upon a long—term rate. The distinction nay veil be important, given the crucial
role played by the interest effect on spending. We define the real long term
interest rate as the rate associated with a consol which pays a constant flow of
dividends equal to one. Accordingly, the price of the consol is 1/B and its
total return includes both dividends and capital gains or losses. With capital
gains equal to d(l/R)dt, the real return is therefore:
B + d(l/R)/dt = B — 1/B
We assume that the short—run public debt and the domestic consols are jrfect
substitutes, so that their returns must be the same:
(21) r=R-/B
Upon linearizing, we have:
(21') = r*(R_r)
where we assume that in the initial steady state B0 = r0 = r". The resulting
model consists of (1) to (8), (10) and (27), where in equation (2), r is
replaced by B. The parameters and initial values used in the simulations are
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exactly as in Section 5. Note also that we revert to. the full—employment case
and assume y = 0, thus eliminating the effects discussed in Sections 6.1 and
6.2. The results of the tax cut are presented in Figures 114, 15 and 16 and
summarized in Table 14, These figures correspond to Figures 10, 11 and 12 above.
Table 14
NoR WithR NoR WithR NoR WithR
x(o) o.8141i 0.81]. 0.897 0.939 a.o146 1.110
r(0) 0.066 0.072 0.078 0.067 0.109 0.060
R(O) —— 0.059 —— 0.086 ——, 0.123
P = F 0.05 0.05 0.092 0.092 0.114 o.1i4
Consider first the perfect substitutability case as in Figure 114. The long
term interest rate smooths it the fluctuations of the short term rate. Hence
on impact the long—nm rate jumps less, and thus private demand is not so much
reduced as when it depends on the short term rate. With a stronger excess
demand in the goods market, the exchange rate impact appreciation is larger.
Exactly the opposite occurs in Figure 15, where the long term interest rate
increases by more than the short term rate on impact. In this case, both rates
have to rise in the final steady state, and this increase is immediately
anticipated by the long rate. With a strong effect of interest rates on demand,
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and maintain goods market equilibrium. In the case of Figure i6, the long—term
rate increase leads to a. larger jump depreciation.
7. Conclusion
The broad result which stands out from this analysis is that the behavior
of the exchange rate, both on impact and in the long run, is ambiguous. The
oft—cited benchmark case of a jump appreciation and a long run depreciation,
is far from general. It is not robust to varying assumptions about the degree
of asset substitutability or to the composition of government spending. It also
appears that initial conditions, characterized by the initial size of the public
debt or the net external position, play a significant role. Two countries, with
an otherwise identical structure, can react differently to fiscal policy because
of past history!
Several issues remain, of course, concerning the robustness of the results
presented here. They rely on standard components of macroeconomic nde1s which,
we believe, are not particularly controversial. The questions, therefore,
center around the many simplifying assumptions that have been made to.allow for
analytical tractability (for instance, the assumption that price flexibility
ensures a fixed output). Variable output may veil affect the determination of
the real exchange rate, though at this stage, we have few general results to
offer on this point. Also at issue is our treatment of rrrnetary policy. There
are many ways to describe "constant ixnetary policy," some ire appealing than
the case of a constant nominal noney stock. Finally, we have no capital
accumulation in our rindel. Ax investment function would introduce some new,
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potentially conlicating features: dostic wealth would differ fron our
definition, the irginal productivity of capital would be driven in the long run
to a level consistent with the real interest rate, thus making the
full—employment output level endogenous. ¼
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Footnotes
1. This equation can be derived as follows. Consider a Tobin portfolio wdel:
Ab* = B*(r* + — r)w, with B*? > 0 and b = B(r* + £IA — dv, with B' C 0.
Taking the ratio and linearizing we obtain the equation in the text.
2. More generally and nre realistically, p can be set to vary over time.
3. The reason is that r changes as a function of all three variables A, b and
b*. With (11), as long as b0 * 0, this brings about changes in g, and
therefore in T — c — g, thus affecting the current account equation (6).
With (8) or (9), (i) implies that c, and therefore T, is only a function of X,
as is shown in section 3. Note, however, that there are alternative policy
regimes compatible with (5) and (8). For example, a government spending
expansion can be represented as g = jiB — (p+r*)b and t = b0r, instead of
(11). In this case the transition nutrix is as in (12) and (13).
1• The equations of these schedules are:
(CA): aX + (l_n)r*w + (mm0)A0
(GO): aX + (l—m)(6+')e$)w + [(rn—n?) + s(l—m)]A=O




—(A/a)[s(a + (1_m)r*b)/(ô + 184I_r*) — (m—rP)b1.
This result can be understood as follows. With an excess denand in the
goods market, a drop in wealth from point A to point A' provides the required
adjustment. But as it implies a reduction in Xb*, interest earnings are
reduced, prompting a current account deficit. This is corrected by a
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depreciation, and a further reduction in wealth to tnintain goods market
equilibrium, as we ntve along G1G1 from A' to B.
6. The equation of the schedules in this case are:
(CA) ciA + (l_m)r*(Ab*) = 0
(GG) aX + (l_m)(6+8i)(Ab*) + £16 — (l—s)r' — •t(i—e)l = 0






8. We do not consider the case where b is negative and sufficiently large, in
absolute value, to lead to an increase in '5* when the exchange rate
depreciates. This case obtains when a devaluation worsens the current account
because it aggravates interest payments on the external debt by more than it
improves the trade balance.
9. The role of perfect foresight is seen by considering the polar case of
static expectations when = 0: more appreciation is required, as r either
does not change at all under perfect substitutability, or increases by less
otherwise, so that nnst of the crowding out is achieved at the expense of
foreign demand. This is seen graphically as a jump to B' on the = 0
schedule.
10. With static expectations, there is no need for a change in A on impact as
the interest rate stays constant: the econon remains in point A on the
I = 0 schedule.
11. Applying the nEthod proposed by Dixit (1980), it can be shown that the
initial exchange rate change is, for b = 0:
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ss2(1—m)
x(o) - A0 = (A/)[G - m +
where 2 is the negative elgenvalue of (12).
12. They satisfy the condition:
+ s = a/ø(1—m) + r* + b(ó/+6i)
If b is not too negative, we see that > r, 2 < < r".
13. From footnote 7, the condition for a long run appreciation is
6 — (1_s)r*. From (19), the condition for a jump depreciation is
> 6 — (l_s)r* + (1—s)s1. Note the difference with the balanced budget
case of Section 14, where (see Figure 8) a high * cannot alone bring about a
short—run depreciation. The reason is that b does not change, so that we then
miss the portfolio balance effect at work in the tax cut case.
lb. This was pointed out to us by Rudi Dornbusch.
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